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FORTY YEARS ON 
Danny Priel* 
 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). x+308pp. 
I. INTO THE RING 
… In the blue corner—always in the blue corner—we have Ronald “Hercules” Dworkin. He has fought 
many fights already, probably too many to remember, won many, but never—this is how it is with 
academics—in a knock-out.1 Yes, that’s what’s so amazing about them: even when it looks like they 
will not have an answer to that last blow, they always come back with something, always with a new 
trick up their sleeve.2 In the other corner, heavyweights Richard Posner, Antonin Scalia, Stanley Fish, 
Jules Coleman, Laurence Tribe, Cass Sunstein, Joseph Raz, and Richard Rorty line up, and they are all 
here to exchange some well-aimed punches. Dworkin, who hardly slowed down since the days of those 
legendary fights with H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, has added the experience that comes with age to the 
agility of his youth, making him adept with all the tools of the academic boxer’s trade: drawing 
distinctions, exposing inconsistencies, using the reductio to show how absurd was his opponent’s view, 
and of course, the Dworkin trademark move, accusing his opponents of misrepresenting his own views 
(e.g., pp. 126, 216-222, 226, 266 n.3, 273 n.16). 
 But if the viewers, initially so impressed by the dexterity of the mind and firmness of the blows, 
now look a little jaded it is because—just like in real boxing—there is just so much one can take home 
from such displays, especially when, as is the case here, this is not the first or even the second time that 
Dworkin meets these opponents. By now it seems that Dworkin and his rivals know the other’s 
maneuvers so well, that they can anticipate all of them. As a result, instead of dazzling performances 
what we get is a long series of calculated parries, interspersed by careful jabs: they may cause some 
                                                                                                                                                                         
* Assistant Professor, University of Warwick School of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions on earlier, much 
longer drafts, I thank audiences at the Universities of Oxford, Illinois, Yale, and Warwick, and in particular Sebastian Elias, 
John Finnis, Chad Flanders, Heidi Hurd, Maris Köpke-Tinturé, Larry Solum, and Ekow Yankah. 
1 It probably has something to do with the fact that “[p]eople in the boxing world share the concept of winning a round 
even though they often disagree about who has won a particular round and about what concrete criteria should be used in 
deciding that question” (p. 10). 




pain, but neither side is going to be forced to give up their game. If necessary they could go on like this 
forever.  
Just like in the real thing, there is some thrill in seeing those displays, especially when performed 
by professionals of the highest order; but it is a rather cheap thrill and the excitement it gives is quickly 
forgotten without a trace. Indeed, even Dworkin himself probably felt that his readers might have 
hoped for something else, but true to form, he tells us at one point that not stepping into the ring for 
yet another round of verbal exchange would be “cowardly” (p. 43)! 
What makes the spectacle even more frustrating is that we can see only one of the players. 
Exciting as it may sound, in reality it makes the match quite difficult to follow. We are forced to guess 
what Dworkin’s opponents say from his own returns. And this often makes it quite difficult to tell 
whether Dworkin sticks to the rules of the game.3 After all, we cannot “license one side of a debate to 
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”4 
Do not get me wrong: serious debate is conducted by advancing arguments and ideas in public so 
others could read and challenge them, with the hope that something—perhaps even truth—would 
emerge. But the problem with academic debates is that the law of diminishing marginal returns applies 
to them with special ferocity with successive responses containing more rhetoric and less substance.5 
Given that Justice in Robes contains so much of that, one might wonder whether it is a book worthy of an 
extended review, especially by an outsider to the original debates. Perhaps we should all just hang on by 
the ropes for the Big League players to come back for yet another round. Such is academic life that we 
can be certain that at some point they will.6 
                                                                                                                                                                         
3 For the accusation that Dworkin misrepresents others’ views see James Allan, Truth’s Empire—A Reply to Ronald 
Dworkin’s ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it’, 26 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 61, 87-88 (2001); Brian Leiter, The End of the 
Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 171 (2004), and the text accompanying note 5, 
infra.  
4 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992). 
5 There is also a increasing tendency to accuse the other of misrepresenting one’s views, which often serves as starting 
point for spin-off debates on the question whether the accusation of misrepresentation is true or not. See, e.g., Richard A. 
Posner, Reply to Critics of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1796, 1797-98 (1998) (arguing 
that Dworkin’s allegation that Posner misrepresented Dworkin’s views is untrue). 
6 In fact, in some cases they already have. Since Justice in Robes collects essays published over a period of fifteen years, in 
some cases there have been subsequent additions to the debate following the piece published in the book. See e.g., Posner, 
supra note 5 (replying to Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998), reprinted at pp. 49-74); 
Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal Theory: A Response to Ronald Dworkin, 29 ARIZ ST. L.J. 377 (1997) (replying to Ronald 




That is why I hope to do something else in this Review. The polemical style of the book and the 
fact that its chapters have all been independently published, make the topics discussed in it seem 
unrelated: a defense of the importance of theory here, some criticism of legal positivism there, and 
remarks on equality everywhere. What I hope to do is connect these disparate strands into a more 
coherent whole. This will allow for a general assessment of the Dworkinian project of explaining and 
justifying law as it emerges from this book, instead of taking sides on individual points of disagreement 
between Dworkin and his opponents.  
But what is the Dworkinian project? In commenting on Dworkin’s work there are usually three 
Dworkins being discussed: first, there is Dworkin the legal philosopher of The Model of Rules, the one 
who is still best known for his critique of legal positivism; then there is Dworkin the constitutional 
scholar of The New York Review of Books and Freedom’s Law, who argues for a “moral reading” of 
understanding the United States Constitution and has argued in favor of a particular (“liberal”) answer to 
many controversial political issues; the third Dworkin is the moral philosopher of Objectivity and Truth: 
You’d Better Believe It, who has argued with great conviction against any kind of relativism or skepticism 
about morality. While all three Dworkins figure in Justice in Robes most treatments of Dworkin’s work 
(including most reviews of Justice in Robes) focus on one aspect of his work while neglecting the others. 
Inevitably, I too will say more on some parts of the book than on others, but one thing that I hope will 
emerge from this essay is that the three Dworkins are (unsurprisingly) one: that is, one cannot 
understand Dworkin’s legal philosophy without understanding his views on the objectivity of morality 
and the active role he assigns to judges in deciding constitutional disputes. I decided to show this by 
focusing on Dworkin’s contributions to legal philosophy, because this is a topic to which Dworkin 
returns at some length in this book, and also because this is the field to which Dworkin’s contributions 
seem to me to have been most significant. Even though my conclusions will often be fairly critical of 
Dworkin’s arguments, I will try to show that some of the issues he has raised are significant and deserve 
close attention.  
Given Dworkin’s prominence this statement may seem odd, but it is not as trivial as it may first 
seem. Some legal philosophers, even those who acknowledge the importance of his contribution to 
other areas, have recently dismissed Dworkin’s work in legal philosophy as fundamentally mistaken and 
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[hereinafter Dworkin, Reply]. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Virtues and Verdicts, NEW REPUBLIC, May 22, 2006, at 32, 34, 37 




of little lasting value.7 Others have suggested that his work is concerned with questions so different 
from those of other legal philosophers that he might not even properly belong among the ranks of 
jurisprudents.8 At least in part this seems like something Dworkin happily acknowledges, as he believes 
much of contemporary legal philosophy is misguided (pp. 33-34). Another aim of this Review, 
therefore, is to explain why, despite significant methodological differences between Dworkin and other 
legal philosophers, his concerns are not very different from theirs, and why, despite deficiencies in his 
arguments, his claims cannot be rejected out of hand.  
II. HOW TO UNDERSTAND LAW 
A. What Is the Question? 
In 1964 Ronald Dworkin opened one of his earliest published works with the following words: 
What, in general, is a good reason for decision by a court of law? This is the question of jurisprudence; it has 
been asked in an amazing number of forms, of which the classic “What is Law?” is only the briefest.9 
As he explained, the question of jurisprudence is how to make sense of what the law requires and what 
judges should do in order to discover that. Twenty years later in a short paper in which he summarized 
his thinking on law, he made it clear that this had been his project all along. He said there that he was 
concerned with the question of “the sense of propositions of law … [the question which] asks what these 
propositions of law should be understood to mean, and in what circumstances they should be taken to 
be true or false or neither.”10 Some forty years after his early essay Dworkin still maintains that his main 
                                                                                                                                                                         
7 Like any other prominent theorist Dworkin had its fair share of criticism. But it has been argued recently that 
Dworkin’s writings have contributed close to nothing of lasting significance to jurisprudence. See Thom Brooks, Book 
Review, 69 MOD. L. REV. 140, 142 (2006) (reviewing DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS (Justine Burley ed., 2004)); Leiter, supra 
note 3, at 165-66 (Dworkin’s jurisprudence is “largely without philosophical merit”). 
8 See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 27 (2d ed. 2005) (claiming that Dworkin’s theory aims 
not just to undermine legal positivism but is a “challenge to analytical jurisprudence”); JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND 
LEGAL THEORY 22-23 & n.31 (2001); cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 240-41 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that Dworkin’s 
theory is concerned with different issues than his); MICHAEL S. MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 104, 306 (2000) (same). 
9 Ronald Dworkin, Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision, 75 ETHICS 47, 47 (1964) (book review). 
10 Ronald Dworkin, Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE 




concern is with understanding what law is “in what I shall call the doctrinal sense,” namely in “what the 
law requires or prohibits or permits or creates” (p. 2). 
It is already at the very first lines of the article published in 1964 that others concerned with the 
question “what is law?” have begun to be puzzled by Dworkin’s approach. For on its face it seems odd to 
say that “what is law?” is only a shorter way of saying “what is a good reason for deciding a case?” or 
“how should a court decide this particular case?”11 Not only do these sentences seem to have an utterly 
different meaning, it does not even seem that answering the first question is particularly helpful for 
answering the second. A natural answer to the question “what is law?” would presumably look 
something like this: “law is the set of rules in which a state determines certain permissions, prohibitions 
and other normative requirements that govern the lives of those under its jurisdiction.” This suggestion 
is, no doubt, incomplete and vague, but it does not seem that any elaboration or clarification would give 
us anything that is going to be helpful in answering the question how cases should be decided. For this 
we need to know the content of the rules in a given jurisdiction, which could be supplemented with a 
theory of adjudication or theory of interpretation. And though such theories are probably going to be 
related in some way to a theory of law, they do not look like the same thing at all. As one critic of 
Dworkin put it, Dworkin offered a theory of adjudication, which he “regard[ed] … willy-nilly and 
without further argument as a theory of law.”12  
One popular way of making this point is to say that Dworkin fails to distinguish between the 
question “what is law (in general)?” and the question “what is the law (applicable in a particular case)?”13 
I believe much of the disagreement with, even incomprehension of, Dworkin’s views stems from failure 
to understand in what sense the question “what is law?” is similar to Dworkin’s question “how should 
judges decide cases?” To see how these two questions are related and why Dworkin might not be guilty 
of a misunderstanding so fundamental that it thwarts his theory right from the start we must look first at 
                                                                                                                                                                         
11 Compare with RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1 (1986), where Dworkin’s first chapter is entitled “What is Law?” 
immediately followed by the explanation that “[i]t matters how judges decide cases.” Id. (emphasis added).  
12 Joseph Raz, The Problem about the Nature of Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW 
AND POLITICS 195, 202-03 (rev. ed. 1994) [hereinafter ETHICS]; see also MARMOR, supra note 8, at 43-44; W.J. WALUCHOW, 
INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM 3 (1994). 
13 For a critique of Dworkin along those lines see, for example, JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN 
DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 180 (2001); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL 
POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 129 (1999); MOORE, supra note 8, at 94-95; Leiter, supra note 3, at 175-76. Using 




the view which takes this distinction very seriously and which Dworkin has always challenged—legal 
positivism. 
B. Two Kinds of Legal Positivism 
When talking about law in the abstract legal philosophers talk about three different things and often 
without clearly distinguishing among them: the validity of legal norms, the normativity of law, and the 
content of legal norms. A legal norm is said to be valid if and only if it is a member of a class of norms 
that can be identified (in some yet unspecified way) as belonging to a certain legal system. The validity 
of a legal norm, in other words, is the “mark” that distinguishes it from other norms, that explains why 
it is a legal norm (as opposed to a social or moral norm). The content of a legal norm is what that norm 
requires us to do (e.g., pay a certain tax), what it prohibits us from doing (e.g., take someone else’s 
property without their consent), what powers it gives us (e.g., to make wills or contracts), or which 
immunities it grants us (e.g., a right against invasion of our privacy). In all cases, we can draw some 
kind of link between a certain set of facts that have to obtain (signing certain documents, earning certain 
amount of money) and a certain legal outcome (the creation of certain contractual rights and duties; the 
duty to pay a certain amount of tax). The normativity of a legal norm is the sense in which the legal 
responses just mentioned are in some sense “non-optional,”14 the way in which legal norms create (or 
purport to create) obligations that people take or refrain from taking certain actions.15 
Clarifying these concepts is important, because disagreements among legal philosophers are often 
best understood as resulting from different views on the relationship between these three concepts. At 
first this suggestion may sound strange: the debate between legal positivism and natural law is usually 
said to be about the relationship between law and morality, with legal positivism taken to be the thesis 
that there is no necessary connection between the two, and natural law (and Dworkin) taking the 
opposite view.16 But I believe this is a crude way of characterizing the difference between legal 
                                                                                                                                                                         
14 HART, supra note 8, at 6. This definition fits criminal law prescriptions particularly well, but it is true of other norms 
as well. Contract law is non-optional in the sense that it defines a set of conditions under which one may use certain 
recognized legal mechanisms in order to create non-optional contractual rights and duties. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and 
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941). Saying more about normativity beyond that would put me in controversial waters 
that I do not wish to enter here. 
15 For more on the distinction between validity, content, and normativity, see Danny Priel, Trouble for Legal Positivism?, 
12 LEGAL THEORY 225, 232-36 (2006). 
16 For positivist claiming no necessary connection between the two see KRAMER, supra note 13, at 1, passim; Jules L. 




positivists and Dworkin. What really is at stake between positivists and Dworkin is the relationship 
between validity, normativity, and content. The difference of opinion on this issue is more fundamental 
because it is of greater explanatory power: once these concepts and their relationships are understood, 
we can understand why Dworkin and his positivist adversaries’ views differ on the relationship between 
law and morality, as well as on many other questions. I believe their differences on such diverse 
questions as whether the law contains something like a rule of recognition, whether the law contains 
principles which are logically distinct from rules, whether there is one right answer to virtually all legal 
questions, whether knowing the content of law involves moral considerations, what kind of relationship 
is there between theory of law and theory of adjudication, and as we shall see even the question why 
Dworkin thinks that the question “what is law?” is a brief way of asking “what count as good reasons for 
a judicial decision?,” ultimately derive from different views about the relationship between validity, 
normativity, and content.  
Positivists disagree among themselves on many questions. As a first cut, however, we can say that 
what unites all of them and distinguishes their account from Dworkin’s is that they treat the question of 
validity as prior to and distinct from the question of content; and some positivists believe that these two 
concepts are also separate from the question of normativity. For Dworkin, as we shall see, the three 
questions are inseparable, and validity, if it plays any role in his account at all, is the least important of 
the three. Initially the positivist view that all three concepts are independent of each other seems quite 
plausible: to know how to decide a case we need first to identify the legal norm that governs the case; 
and to know that we need to know how to identify legal norms in general. And the answer positivists 
give to this question seems natural and appealing: identifying valid legal norms requires identifying a 
certain procedure by which legal norms are promulgated, not looking into the norm’s content. After all, 
there are many very different legal norms with very different content, but what is common to all of 
them, what makes them legal norms, is that they came in a particular manner by which they can be 
identified. Thus, the “nature” of law on this picture is that norms come into being if they adhere to a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Patterson ed., 1996) (“All legal positivists [believe] … that there is no necessary connection between law and morality”). In 
contrast Dworkin has accepted the natural law position that such a connection does exist. See Ronald A. [sic] Dworkin, 
“Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165 (1982). That this is not what stands between the two camps can perhaps 
be attested by the fact that recently several positivists have argued that there are necessary connections between law and 
morality. See, e.g., John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 222-25 (2001) (calling this a “myth”); 





certain formal test by which we can distinguish legal norms from other things in the world. Following 
Hart, the name commonly used for this formal test is “rule of recognition.”  
This is the positivist argument for separating a legal norm’s validity from its content. Many 
positivists have also argued that we can understand in what way a legal norm is binding (“non-optional”) 
independently of its content: it is not what the law requires that makes it binding; rather it is the fact 
that it is the law that that makes it binding.17 Taken together these arguments explain why at least some 
positivists consider all three concepts to be independent of each other, and why validity is the most 
fundamental concept in identifying law: to know what the law requires and how it is binding on us, we 
must first identify legal norms. 
The problem with this suggestion is that it is ambiguous. To see the difference between the two 
claims they make think of legal norms as closed boxes. The content of the norm, that is, what the norm 
requires, is found inside the box. What the legal positivist argues is that there is a mark outside these 
boxes by which we can identify them as legal norms without having to look inside the box to examine 
their content. Now there are two ways of understanding the positivist claim: according to the first, the 
mark identifies those things that are legal norms, but it cannot identify which norm is applicable to 
which case, since this is already a question of the norm’s content, and that is something that identifying 
the mark of legal norms cannot tell us. Thus, an English judge could know that in general things that 
have been enacted by the Queen in Parliament are laws,18 so she could identify some things as law, but 
this would not tell her what the law requires on any particular question. The second interpretation of 
the positivist claim is that we can identify individual legal norms and so what they require. What it 
cannot tell us is to which particular cases it applies; or perhaps it can tell us that too, but not whether it 
will be “controlling” in that case or whether it could be defeated by other norms.  
Different positivists, sometimes even the same theorist in different places, seem to vacillate 
between these two theses. At times we are told that legal positivism is a thesis for the identification of 
the “nature of law,” i.e. what distinguishes the set of all valid laws from other things in the world. 
According to this view the “rule of recognition” can only identify those marks that distinguish all laws 
from everything else.19 But at other times positivists argue for something much stronger, namely that 
                                                                                                                                                                         
17 See H.L.A. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 82, 84 (A.I. Melden ed., 1958) (arguing 
that legal rules create content-independent obligation). 
18 HART, supra note 8, at 102. 
19 Id. at 6-10; Joseph Raz, Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1107 (1986) (reviewing RONALD 




with the rule of recognition we can “identify[] [the] primary rules of obligation” in a particular 
jurisdiction.20 
Let me begin with the second interpretation. The problem with it is that it is hard to see how a 
formal test like the rule of recognition could identify individual legal norms. At times it seems that this 
point has just not been noticed, although it is hard to see how the identification of what makes 
something belong to the set of legal norms can tell us anything about what individual norms require and 
thus how one should behave in individual cases. No single formal test like the rule of recognition (even 
if a highly complex one) could alone tell us how to identify the individual cases to which particular legal 
norms apply: for this we must add an account that explains how to move from the identification of 
something as belonging to the group of legal norms to knowing the content of individual legal norms.21  
The only attempt I am familiar with to answer this challenge is the claim that once we have a test 
for recognizing what separates law from non-law, and then “the law can be simply understood and 
applied straightforwardly,”22 according to the “literal”23 meaning of its words. That is to say, according 
to this view the rule of recognition allows us to identify individual legal norms, and once we have 
identified them we can immediately know the content of individual legal norms. But this view is 
mistaken, because this “literal” meaning is either a tautological reference to whatever is accepted as the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
to do, is to identify which acts are acts of legislation and which are the rendering of binding judicial decisions, or more 
generally, which acts create law.”); Joseph Raz, On the Nature of Law, 82 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 1, 3-5 
(1996); see also note 26, infra. 
20 HART, supra note 8, at 100. Contrast this view with Hart’s much weaker claim that all the rule of recognition 
“identify[ies is] the authoritative sources of law.” HART, supra note 8, at 266 (emphasis added). Andrei Marmor is probably 
most extreme when he suggests that positivism aims to explain what makes “statements of the form—‘According to the law 
in ___ X has a right/duty/etc. to ___.’” ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUE 135 (2001). Marmor seems 
to suggest here that the formal test of the rule of recognition can identify conclusive legal propositions. 
21 See Priel, supra note 15, especially at 236-43. Some legal positivists, so-called “inclusive” positivists, allow some 
content-based (and not merely formal) considerations to be part of the rule of recognition. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 
13, at 103-48 (2001); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY MEET 17-140 (2004); WALUCHOW, supra note 12, 
at 80-141 (1994). However, this does not solve the problem identified in the text, because their argument is that the tests for 
identifying valid legal norms can include substantive constraints (for instance, that a putative immoral norm cannot be a legal 
norm). But this presupposes that there is a prior and non-content based method for individuating legal norms and telling its 
content, which their theory does not supply. Even those (like Coleman) who believe that certain norms can become legal 
purely in virtue of their content have to explain how we are to know which of the myriad of possible content-based norms out 
there are legal and which are not.  
22 MARMOR, supra note 8, at 95. 




right interpretation of what the law requires in particular cases, or a false claim that in all times and 
places what the law requires is determined by a single test. Understood this way legal positivism suffers 
from a fundamental error: it presents itself as an account for identifying what the law requires, but it 
does so only by falsely assuming that once one knows the features that identify valid legal norms in 
general one can also know the content of each one of them.24  
This suggests we should look instead at the first interpretation of the positivist project. According 
to this view the positivist account was never intended to give judges a procedure for deciding cases,25 in 
fact not even an account on how to identify legal norms. The role of the rule of recognition is not to be 
used as a guide of individual legal norms. It only plays a role in an account of the “law-making 
properties.” Whatever else one may say about a legal system it must have a rule of recognition, and 
however we determine the content of its norms, it is because the rule of recognition provides us with 
some guidance on how to do this.  
The legal positivist on this account is a bit like a natural scientist: there are, no doubt, many 
contingent facts about law, many differences between laws in different times and places, but underneath 
all of them there are (or at least there may be) some properties in virtue of which some things in the 
world are laws, and the positivist aims to give an account of those properties.26 Notice that on this 
version of legal positivism what drives the legal positivist’s distinction between law and morality is not 
                                                                                                                                                                         
24 On this reading of legal positivism its problem is more fundamental than the problem Dworkin believed undermines 
it. Dworkin’s challenge to legal positivism, what he called the “semantic sting,” is roughly that legal positivism cannot explain 
the existence of prevalent disagreements among lawyers on fundamental and central questions. But we now see that the 
problem is not so much the existence of fundamental disagreements among lawyers (something that many positivists have 
argued they can explain), but rather how to identify the content of legal norms in the first place. Even if there had been no 
disagreements among lawyers at all, this version of positivism provides a false account on how to identify what the law 
requires. 
25 See HART, supra note 8, at 240; H.L.A. Hart, Comment, in ISSUES, supra note 10, at 35, 36 (“there is a standing need 
for a form of legal theory … the perspective of which is not … what the law requires in particular cases.”).  
26 Over the past three decades this view has been most eloquently defended by Joseph Raz. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Can 
There Be a Theory of Law?, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 324, 328 (Martin P. 
Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (“only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of law”); JOSEPH RAZ, 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 104 (1979) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY] (“Since a legal theory 
must be true of all legal systems … the identifying features … [of law] it characterizes … must of necessity be very general 
and abstract. … It must fasten only on those features of legal systems which they must possess regardless of the special 





so much a substantive claim about the separation between law and morality, but rather a methodological 
one: if one wishes to understand a certain phenomenon, the first step is to see the ways in which it is 
different from similar things.27 
Dworkin has serious doubts that this project is tenable (pp. 215-16), and I share this view, 
although for somewhat different reasons.28 These arguments are not directly related to our concerns, so 
I will not discuss them here. But even if they can be adequately answered, on this interpretation legal 
positivism turns out to be not false but seriously incomplete: this version of legal positivism is a theory 
of law that does not give us any clue as to how to move from identifying the group of things that are 
laws to knowing the content of individual norms. In other words it is a theory of law, that by its 
proponents’ own admission is silent on the question of identifying what most of those who come in 
contact with the law care most about, what it requires of them.29 
C. The Relationship Between Content and Normativity 
Whatever are the merits of this kind of legal positivism, clarifying what positivism was about suggests 
something interesting, namely that the gap between the question “what is law?” and the questions 
Dworkin is interested in, “what is the law?” or “how should judges decide cases?,” may not be as wide as 
it seemed at first. These questions are separate only if we are interested in distinguishing those things 
that are laws from all other things in the world. But this is not at all Dworkin’s concern. If we are 
interested in identifying individual legal norms, then there may be no basis for the accusation: “Law” in 
this sense is just the aggregate of “the laws” of particular cases (cf. p. 221). There may simply be nothing 
beyond that for us to look for. And since judges are required to decide cases by following “the law,” to 
identify what the law requires is also to identify how judges should decide cases. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
27 See John Austin, The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence, in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 
365, 371 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954) (1832): “By a careful analysis of leading terms, law is detached from morals, and the 
attention of the student of jurisprudence is confined to the distinctions and divisions which relate to law exclusively.” It is 
evident from this passage that Austin’s reason for separating law from morality is methodological: “detaching” it from morals 
allows us to understand it better. This is different from (though consistent with) Austin’s famous substantive slogan that “the 
existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.” Id. at 184. See also Joseph Raz, Incorporation by Law, 10 LEGAL 
THEORY 1, 15-16 (2004). 
28 See Danny Priel, Jurisprudence and Necessity, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 173, 178-84 (2007); Danny Priel, Evaluating 
Descriptive Jurisprudence, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 139 (2007). 
29 In addition, it turns out that any attempt to reinterpret the rule of recognition in a way that makes it one element that 
figures in identifying individual legal norms forces the theorist to recognize that identifying those requires taking evaluative 




This point undermines the distinction between legal validity and the content of legal norms, but it 
still does not tell us how judges should identify what the law requires. This is where the third concept 
mentioned earlier—that of normativity—comes in. Again, it will be useful to contrast Dworkin’s 
position with that of the positivists. The statement “you have a moral obligation not to kill others,” is 
true, if it is true, in virtue of its content, and not in virtue of some mark of validity. Likewise, what makes 
a particular moral norm binding, i.e. what explains its normativity, is its content, not the fact that it was 
said by someone or was promulgated by some recognized procedure. As we have already seen, some 
positivists argue that one of the differences between law and morality is that unlike the case of morality, 
law’s normativity does not depend on the content of its norms. Hart offered an early defense of this 
view when he tried to show that what makes legal norms binding was the fact that they were part of a 
certain social practice, and not because what they required was necessarily morally good.30 More recent 
versions of the same approach tried to explain law’s normativity by developing the idea that law is a 
convention or a shared co-operative activity.31 
But Dworkin objects to this too. Dworkin’s defense of law’s normativity goes all the way to law’s 
content. In an earlier book he wrote that “[j]urisprudence is the general part of adjudication, a silent 
prologue to any decision at law.”32 This passage puzzled—and was vigorously contested by—many a 
reader of Dworkin.33 It is usually interpreted by critics to suggest that in order “to know the law 
governing each case one must be making, explicitly or implicitly, assumptions about the nature of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
30 See HART, supra note 8, at 55-59. This is but one reading of Hart’s view. It is also possible to read Hart as specifying 
the conditions under which people consider themselves to be under an obligation. For a critique of Hart which assumes the first 
interpretation see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 53-58 (2d ed. 1990); Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules II, 
in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 46, 48-58 (rev. ed. 1978) [hereinafter RIGHTS].  
It should be noted, however, that some philosophers have argued that the basis of moral obligation is also conventional. 
See, e.g., GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 103-14 (1977). Hart himself offered 
some remarks in a similar vein. See HART, supra note 8, at 193-200. 
31 See Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982). For the 
idea of law as a shared co-operative idea see COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 97-100, 157-60; Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and 
Practical Reasoning, 8 LEGAL THEORY 387 (2002). Dworkin criticizes this view (pp. 195-96).  
32 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 90. Shortly afterwards he adds to the same effect that “[t]he law of a community … is the 
scheme of rights and responsibilities that … license coercion.” Id. at 93. 
33 See, e.g., HART, supra note 8, at 241-43; KRAMER, supra note 13, at 164-73; WALUCHOW, supra note 12, at 24-27; 
Joseph Raz, Two Views about the Nature of Law: A Partial Comparison, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 1, 32-36 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001); see also Larry Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of 




law.”34 But this, I believe, is a misunderstanding of Dworkin’s point. Properly understood this passage 
fits Dworkin’s general account very well and is in fact quite plausible. What Dworkin says here is that 
for law to create obligations it has to be legitimate; otherwise it only creates what has the appearance of 
obligation, but is in fact merely a demand backed by the threat of punishment. But since we believe that 
law is capable of being legitimate (and only when it is legitimate it creates obligations), then just like in 
the case of morality, we must look at law’s content in order to know whether it creates genuine 
obligations. If, for instance, the law of a state is illegitimate its demands for one’s tax money are no 
more legitimate (and thus no more capable of creating obligations) than those of the robber who 
demands one’s wallet. (It was after all Hart, the positivist, who insisted that law is not the gunman 
situation writ large.35) To be sure, the way the money is demanded and the identity of the person (or 
body) who makes the demand may affect the determination whether the demand is legitimate: a just 
demand for my tax money may not be legitimate if made by a government that got to power by force. 
Nevertheless, one crucial factor in determining whether the demand is legitimate is what is being 
demanded. From the other direction, we rely on the fact that law is capable of creating obligations to 
determine what the law requires. In this bidirectional way we link between what the law requires (its 
content) and what it means for law to make a requirement (its normativity).  
Interpreted this way Dworkin’s account appears to be quite robust. There are six features of it that 
are worth emphasizing: First, to some degree the question of legitimacy depends on the question of the 
identification of law, or, to use the language used before, the validity, content, and normativity of law 
are closely tied. Second, Dworkin’s account explains his claim that jurisprudence is a branch of political 
morality (p. 241), for answering the question “what is (the) law?” turns, at least in part, on the question 
whether the law is legitimate, and this requires us to consider questions of political morality. Third, it 
explains why the question of legitimacy (and therefore the question of law’s normativity) is asked at the 
level of individual norms and not at the level of legal systems: even though we could make some general 
claims on the matter, in the end whether some demand creates an obligation one should follow has to 
be answered on a case by case basis, based on the content of the demand. This is the sense in which 
                                                                                                                                                                         
34 Raz, supra note 33, at 34. Raz later offers a somewhat different interpretation of this passage according to which 
judges’ decision ought to “conform … with the correct theory of the nature of law.” Id. at 35. I believe this is also a mistaken 
reading of Dworkin’s idea. The misunderstanding is the result of trying to understand Dworkin’s work from the perspective 
of the legal positivist approach that identifies the nature of law with the necessary features of law and ties those to legal 
validity. 




jurisprudence and political philosophy are presupposed by every legal decision.36 Fourth, because the 
question of legitimacy can be raised with regard to every legal norm, we can understand Dworkin’s 
otherwise surprising claim that his theory of law “is equally at work in easy cases [as in hard cases], but 
since the answers to the questions it puts are … obvious [with regard to easy cases], or at least seem to 
be so, we are not aware that any theory is at work at all.”37 There are at least seven ways of drawing the 
line between easy and hard cases: as a distinction between cases involving simple facts and cases 
involving highly complex facts; between simple legal issues (parking in a no-parking area) and highly 
complex law (complex tax rules); between matters governed by law and matters on which there is a 
lacuna in the law; between cases in which there seems to be only one applicable legal norm and cases 
which seem to be governed by several, conflicting legal norms; between cases in which judges have 
little or no discretion and cases in which they are given wide discretion; between cases in which the law 
conforms with morality and cases in which what the law requires seems to be in conflict with our moral 
intuitions; and finally between cases that are socially uncontroversial and cases dealing with matters on 
which society is divided. But whichever way this distinction is drawn, understood as a question of 
normativity and legitimacy, Dworkin’s claim makes sense: the need to legitimate the use of force is 
equally pressing and goes “all the way down” in easy cases as in hard cases. Fifth, the particular decisions 
implicate our more general commitments as to what could count as obligation-creating practices: if we 
interpret a particular instance as one of obligation-creating law (as opposed to a mere demand backed 
by threat), then this has to figure in as part of a larger picture of what could count as law more 
generally. This way, again, the decision at the particular level cannot be separated from the more 
abstract and general level. Finally, this account explains why, if we are interested in the legitimacy of 
the use of force by the state, the fact that there exists a practice of paying attention to, say, certain 
pronouncements that come out of Congress, does not suffice. Rather, it is only because we can provide 
some normative account that justifies paying attention to those pronouncements we call statutes, that 
explains why they are laws.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
36 This is why I disagree with Leiter when he says that “while Dworkin often writes as if his arguments about affirmative 
action, free speech, judicial confirmations, the rights of defendants, and so on, depended on his jurisprudential claims, the 
good news is that they are almost all detachable from them.” Leiter, supra note 3, at 177. It may be true that Dworkin’s 
theory of law does not entail his views on these matters, but this is not the same thing as to say that the two aspects of 
Dworkin’s work are not related.  
37 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 354; accord id. at 266 (“easy cases are … only special cases of hard ones”). This seems 




It would be a mistake, however, to think at this point that any of this implies that judges should 
consider questions of political morality in their judgments. Even if we accept everything in this 
reconstruction of Dworkin’s argument we may still conclude that courts can be legitimate only if judges 
refrain as much as they can from relying on (overt) moral arguments. This conclusion in support of non-
political courts may itself be based on moral and political considerations such as separation of powers, 
democracy, judicial competence and individual responsibility (cf. p. 174).38 This, however, is not 
Dworkin’s view. He believes that what makes a judicial decision legitimate, and ultimately what justifies 
the authority of law, is that it makes the correct moral demands; and since he also believes courts are 
capable of finding what the morally right answer to political question is (perhaps even more so than 
other branches of government), they ought to engage in moral deliberation. As this conclusion does not 
follow from Dworkin’s argument as outlined until now, he needs to offer a separate argument for this 
conclusion. He does. So the question to which we must turn now is what makes a judicial decision 
legitimate. 
III. CAN THE DWORKINIAN MODEL BE JUSTIFIED? 
It stands to reason that in order for judicial decisions to be legitimate judges should follow the law. But 
what exactly does it mean for judges to follow the law? How should judges approach their task of 
following the law in order to render their decisions legitimate? Dworkin’s answer is that judges’ 
decisions are correct as a matter of law, and hence legitimate, if judges consciously try to determine the 
moral rights and duties of the parties in question and use this data to interpret the relevant legal 
materials. The argument essentially is that the state must treat those subject to its laws as bearers of 
rights and most fundamentally the right to equal concern and respect. This demand applies to all 
branches of government, but it is especially true of courts, because courts are “forums of principle,”39 
that is, unlike other branches of government courts are places to which people come to claim what they 
are entitled to according to pre-existing moral principle. As Dworkin put it already in his first academic 
                                                                                                                                                                         
38 For moral arguments in support of exactly this view see TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL 
POSITIVISM 85-87 (1996); GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 405-06, 425-26 (1986) 
(discussing Bentham’s arguments). Similar arguments have also been invoked against judicial review. See, e.g., Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 




publication, those who come to court asking for redress, never come to court as supplicants hoping for 
the court’s compassion or mercy, they come as litigants, demanding what’s theirs by right.40  
Dworkin thus believes that what renders a judicial decision correct is that it complies with the way 
morality requires we treat the person in question. But this requirement could clash with another 
strongly held demand, namely that the law be public and impartial and that those who administer it will 
not rely on their personal views in applying and enforcing it. An explicit call for judges to rely on moral 
considerations may result in biased decisions based on different judges’ personal views on what’s moral, 
even if the judges make a conscientious effort not to do that. And it goes without saying that this hardly 
seems like a recipe for legitimate court decisions.  
Dworkin of course recognizes that there may be an occasional judge who abuses her job, or even a 
corrupt legal system in which the judiciary as a whole routinely and pervasively does so, but this does 
not undermine his belief in his model according to which judges can discover the objective content of 
morality. And he believes that despite acknowledging great controversies about what morality requires 
in particular circumstances. Dworkin’s answer thus has two components. First, that a politically 
involved judiciary can rely on moral values and still follow the law, and second, that judges should do so. 
Dworkin does not distinguish between these two issues in this way in Justice in Robes, but his focus in the 
book is more on the first question than on the second. I will therefore follow him and dedicate most of 
my discussion, in Sections III.A and III.B, to this question. Section III.C will raise some doubts 
regarding Dworkin’s answer to the second question. 
A. Right Answers Out of Disagreement 
Dworkin’s argument rests on the assumption that there are objective moral values on which judges 
should anchor their decisions in their attempt to reach the right, legitimate, decisions. But a relativist 
can challenge this view in at least two different ways. First, she will say, each society, perhaps even each 
person, has a different set of moral values which cannot be judged as correct or incorrect by the moral 
standards adopted by others. The second challenge is epistemic: according to this argument even if in 
some sense there is a right answer to moral questions, given the pervasive and seemingly irresolvable 
societal disagreements on such matters, we cannot know what the right answer is. When those 
questions are raised in the political domain, the best decision procedure we have is to follow a 
majoritarian rule. Giving courts the power to rule on such matters is inconsistent with this decision 
                                                                                                                                                                         




procedure, because judges are unelected, unaccountable, and sometimes rule against unambiguous 
popular majorities. 
For someone who believes that the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on their moral 
correctness such challenges are crucial to answer, and it is no wonder that Dworkin indeed dedicates so 
much space to defending the objectivity of morality, not so much for its own sake, but as part of his 
argument about how judges should decide cases. In Justice in Robes Dworkin does not discuss the 
challenge from democracy, although he did so in other writings. There he argued that in cases in which 
the law represents a societal choice, courts should follow that choice only if such choice does not flout 
fundamental rights. When fundamental rights are infringed, judges should ignore majoritarian 
preferences and rely on the “trumping” power of rights over majorities.41 But this answer presupposes 
that there is a satisfactory answer to the first challenge, i.e. that despite the controversy about moral 
values, they have objective content which judges can find and rely on in their judgments. Though not 
stated in quite this way, this is, I believe, the place of Dworkin’s arguments in favor of moral objectivity 
within the larger structure of his overall account: explaining why morality is objective is a crucial aspect 
of his theory explaining why courts may be legitimate, and why on matters of rights and duties judges 
need not care much about what the majority thinks. For Dworkin to explain the objectivity of morality 
is ultimately to explain the legitimacy of courts and in this way answer the question “what is law?” 
But do Dworkin’s argument for the objectivity of morality despite pervasive disagreement hold 
up? 
B. Interpretive Concepts and Objectivity 
(1) What Are Interpretive Concepts? 
Dworkin does not aim to give a psychological, logical, or historical account of the fact of pervasive 
disagreement about values. He takes it for granted that such disagreements exist (pp. 77-78). He argues 
that these disagreements do not undermine his claim that moral propositions have determinate answer, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
41 For a succinct account see Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 
1984). The underlying rationale is that majoritarian preferences are themselves defensible only because they guarantee that 
each person is treated with equal concern and respect. Therefore they have no force when they violate this demand. See also 
RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 140-41 (2006) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY]; DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 23-28. Similar ideas are found in DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL 




and he elaborates a method he believes would lead judges (and others) to reach the correct answer to 
legal disputes.  
The key to Dworkin’s solution is what he calls “interpretive concepts,” a notion he introduced in 
Law’s Empire42 and that has been central to his thinking ever since. In Justice in Robes Dworkin begins by 
contrasting interpretive concepts with criterial concepts and natural kind concepts: criterial concepts 
such as book are concepts whose extension is fixed by a set of necessary and sufficient criteria (pp. 9-10). 
Two people share a criterial concept only when they (at least roughly) share the criteria for their 
application. Natural kind concepts such as water are concepts whose extension is fixed by what certain 
things in the world turn out to be (even if this conflicts with societal attitudes on the matter), and 
therefore on whose content we defer to experts (p. 10). Two people share a natural kind concept if 
they are talking about the same substance, even if their beliefs on that substance are different and even if 
their beliefs on that substance are largely false. 
Why does Dworkin think that we need another kind of concept to explain moral and legal 
discourse? It makes no sense, says Dworkin, to think of political concepts as natural kind concepts, 
because, as he is fond of saying, they have no DNA (pp. 3, 113, 152, 215). But in that case why not say 
that moral concepts are criterial? According to this view there are certain criteria that fix the meaning 
of, say, justice, and if there are disagreements between people about what constitutes justice it simply 
shows that though they use the same word, they in fact have different concepts of justice. Dworkin 
rejects this answer, because he believes it leads to absurd conclusions. He thinks that only if we share a 
concept we can make sense of disagreement. If, to take the well-worn example, I talk about “bank” 
thinking about the edge of a river and you talk about “bank” thinking of a financial institution, and we 
disagree over the question whether banks are often damp, then our disagreement is not real, because we 
are not talking about the same thing.43 But since “lawyers obviously do genuinely disagree about the 
content of the law of their jurisdiction” (p. 221, emphasis added), we must have a different explanation 
for disagreement in law. Interpretive concepts are supposed to provide the solution, for they are 
supposed to explain the possibility of concepts that have no DNA but have objective content despite the 
existence of persistent disagreement over their content. Thus interpretive concepts play a crucial role in 
Dworkin’s overall account, because only if such concepts exist can there be objective right answers to 
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the question what the law requires, which as we have seen, is an essential step for establishing the 
legitimacy of the demands courts make. 
But in what sense can we say that two people that have radically different beliefs as to what justice 
demands share the concept of justice? Just inventing a new kind of concept and saying that people can 
share it despite substantial disagreement would be special pleading. We need a plausible account of 
what such concepts are. Oddly, despite the centrality of interpretive concepts to his overall argument, 
until Justice in Robes Dworkin never gave a clear definition of what he had meant when he first 
introduced these concepts. In Justice in Robes he tries to remedy this by giving the following explanation: 
Some of our concepts function differently …: they function as interpretive concepts that encourage us to reflect on 
and contest what some practice we have constructed requires. People in the boxing world share the concept of 
winning a round even though they often disagree about who has won a particular round and about what 
concrete criteria should be used in deciding that question. Each of them understands that the answer to these 
questions turn on the best interpretation of the rules, conventions, expectations, and other phenomena of 
boxing and of how all these are best brought to bear in making that decision on a particular occasion. …  
Interpretive concepts … require that people share a practice: they must converge in actually treating the 
concept as interpretive. But that does not mean converging in the application of the concept. People can share 
such a concept even when they dramatically about its instances. So a useful theory of interpretive concept—a 
theory of justice or of winning a round—cannot simply report the criteria people use to identify instances or 
simply excavate the deep structure of what people mainly agree are instances. A useful theory of an interpretive 
concept must itself be an interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which the 
concept figures. [Pp. 10-12, emphases added.] 
Dworkin does not demand much. As he says in a different place, people “share the concept 
[justice] because they participate in a social practice of judging acts and institutions just and unjust and 
because each has opinions, articulate or inarticulate, about what the right way to continue the practice 
on particular occasions: the right judgments to make and the right behavior in response to those 
judgments” (p. 224).44 Dworkin concedes that we can rule out some claims about interpretive concepts 
                                                                                                                                                                         
44 Dworkin also equates interpretive concepts with “essentially contested” concepts (p. 221), alluding to a term coined 
in W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 167 (1956), and which bears some similarity to 
Dworkin’s ideas. See id. at 169. Dworkin, however, does not mention Gallie’s essay, so it remains unclear to what extent he 
subscribes to Gallie’s specific arguments. But see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975), reprinted in 
DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 81, 103 n.1 [hereinafter Dworkin, Hard Cases] (referring to Gallie’s article in support of 
similar ideas). Though it is by no means conclusive it is worth noting that Gallie himself tended to the view that law is not an 
essentially contested concept. See W.B. GALLIE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 190 (1964). For support 




on semantic grounds alone, for instance the claim that “seven is the most unjust of the prime numbers” 
(p. 151), but he maintains that all the interesting debates, all the debates that political philosophers and 
lawyers seriously engage in, are not of this sort.  
To understand Dworkin’s idea we need first to distinguish between two senses in which the word 
“concept” is used. It is used, especially in the literature of philosophy of mind, to refer to the basic 
constituent element of thought of a person.45 Call these I-concepts (“I” for internal). There are moments 
that Dworkin seems to adopt this sense of the word, for example when he writes that people “must 
converge in actually treating the concept as interpretive” (p. 11, emphases added) in order for it to be 
interpretive. But concepts in this sense do not “encourage us to reflect” (p. 10, see also p. 224) on 
them. They are merely elements of thought. So it makes more sense to say that Dworkin uses concepts 
in another sense, as something like “Idea,” that is, as a kind of abstract formulation of the fundamental 
features of an object. Call these E-concepts (“E” for external), because these concepts do not necessarily 
represent the mental content of any particular person. It is evident that Dworkin has this sense in mind 
when he talks about the way such concepts “function” by encouraging people to think about certain 
practices. It is in this sense in mind that he says (in what seems like a contradiction with his words just 
quoted) that “[i]t is hardly a decisive objection that very few people would identify their own practice 
[of law] in that way [i.e., as an interpretive concept]: we are engaged in philosophical explanation, not 
vicarious semantic introspection” (p. 12, emphasis added). Certain concepts are interpretive concepts 
even if (some) people don’t treat them as such. 
Even with these clarifications Dworkin’s idea is still quite vague. So I offer now a set of seven 
features which together capture what Dworkin means by interpretive concepts: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Why does this matter? It matters because the concept of essentially contested concepts is itself contested, or at least 
quite murky. On the one hand it seems that Dworkin would accept MacIntyre’s take on the concept of essentially contested 
concepts. MacIntyre said that when dealing with social practices such as “politics, education, or science[, d]ebate within such a 
practice is inseparable from debate about the practice, and both form parts of each practice.” Alasdair MacIntyre, The Essential 
Contestability of Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1, 6 (1973). On the other hand, some commentators understood such concepts 
to lack objective content of the kind Dworkin is interested in. As one scholar suggested, essential contestability of concepts 
leads to “an ambitious thesis of conceptual relativism.” John N. Gray, On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts, 5 POL. 
THEORY 331, 341 (1977); see also Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW & 
PHIL. 137, 148-53 (2002). While conceptual relativism is consistent with some senses of objectivity, it is inconsistent with the 
sense Dworkin uses the word (pp. 37-38). 
45 See Ray Jackendoff, What is a Concept, That a Person May Grasp It?, 4 MIND & LANGUAGE 68 (1989), reprinted in 
CONCEPTS: CORE READINGS 305, 305-06 (Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis eds., 1999), whose distinction between I-




(a) They are (E-)concepts that refer to social practices. 
(b) People share these concepts when they agree, roughly, about the importance of those concepts (p. 148), as 
well as about manifestations of the practice (e.g., the workings of courts are a manifestation of the 
interpretive concept law). 
(c) Yet people who share these concepts disagree about the “best interpretation” of the practice, and 
consequently how the practice should be manifested in particular instances. Thus, when explaining the 
notion of interpretive value he says that for it to be interpretive “those who accept it as a value must … 
disagree about precisely what value it is” (p. 169, emphasis added). 
(d) These disagreements are “interpretive,” not “conceptual,” meaning that they are evaluative all the way 
down. In other words, there is no way of distinguishing between what the practice is in the abstract and 
how it requires us to behave in particular circumstances (pp. 154-55). Hence, we cannot give a “neutral” 
definition of what counts as law or justice. All such accounts will presuppose some, possibly unstated, 
normative assumptions. That’s why all contesting accounts are “interpretations” of the practice, all aiming 
to show it in its best light.  
(e) There is no known way of resolving disagreements about what counts as the practice or for proving the 
correctness of one interpretation of the practice. Dworkin rejects the view that in ethics or law “nothing 
can count as a good argument … unless it is demonstrably persuasive, that is, unless no one who is rational 
can or will resist it” (p. 267 n.14). He argues that it is wrong to “import[] standards of good argument that 
are foreign to a practice into it from some external level of skepticism” (id.).46 As a result, the 
disagreements are persistent: “We argue for our constitutional interpretations, knowing that others will 
inevitably reject our arguments, and that we cannot appeal to shared principles of either political morality or 
constitutional method to demonstrate that we are right” (p. 127, emphases added). 
(f) Nonetheless, there are objective right answers to such disagreements, and these are answers that are not 
determined by (although they may be partly dependent upon) existing opinion as to what counts as the 
best interpretation of the practice. 
(g) Relatedly, an interpretation of the practice is always open for revision. Even if there is universal agreement 
on an interpretation of the practice, the agreement does not render the interpretation true, or make 
contesting it otiose. For instance, even if everyone were to believed that there is nothing wrong with 
slavery, that would not change the fact that slavery is wrong (p. 60). 
This, I believe, is a clearer explication of the notion of interpretive concepts than anything 
Dworkin has ever provided. But it does not yet answer the question whether there are any interpretive 
concepts. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
46 Dworkin denies the familiar distinction between first-order moral statements and meta-ethical, second order, 
statements about moral statements. He calls this distinction Archimedeanism and argues that it is false. For discussion see 
Subsection III.B(2), infra. But Dworkin’s claim about the undemonstrability of moral proposition is itself not a first-order 




(2) Are There Any Interpretive Concepts? 
What reasons does Dworkin supply for thinking that the seven features enumerated above 
correctly describe political, moral, and legal concepts? Dworkin’s relies on two observations: one, that 
the content of political concepts is never exhausted by the discourse about those concepts; the other, 
that disagreements about political concepts cannot be resolved. Let us consider these claims and their 
implications. 
If I point at a table and say “this is a sofa” I make an error, and if my error is not just the result of 
thoughtlessness or poor command of the English language, it is because I am mistaken about the content 
of the E-concept of sofa. What fixes the objective content of the concept is an implicitly accepted set of 
criteria by a community, i.e. it is the existence of some kind of societal (conventional) agreement “on 
semantic grounds” (p. 151) about the matter. If I employ the concept sofa differently, I am wrong. But 
an entire community cannot be wrong about sofas: the communal sense of what sofas are is fixed by 
what people believe sofas are.47 In contrast, in the case of interpretive concepts Dworkin believes it is 
always open for people to question the content of such concepts, and they can always offer novel 
“interpretations” of them that show these concepts in their “best light.” Thus what counts as the right 
answer to the question “what is the content of the concept of justice?” is never fully determined by 
people’s attitudes on the concept.  
But at the same time Dworkin does not want to reach the conclusion that there is something 
outside our lives that fixes the content of moral concepts in the same way that the chemical structure of 
water fixes what water is. If that were the case we could describe moral concepts without being 
engaged in moral argument; we would simply be describing the features of such concepts in the same 
way that we describe the features of natural kind concepts like water. But Dworkin vigorously rejects 
this view, which he calls Archimedeanism (pp. 142-43). Archimedeanism presupposes two levels of 
moral discourse, one “internal” to morality about what one should do, and another “external” about 
what moral concepts mean. Dworkin’s response is that “the external level that [Archimedeans] hope[] to 
occupy does not exist” (pp. 38-39).48 So Dworkin must carve a space for a kind of concept whose 
                                                                                                                                                                         
47 This standard of correctness conforms to what Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter called “minimal objectivity,” according 
to which “what seems right to the majority of the community determines what is right.” See Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, 
Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 203, 253 (Andrei Marmor 
ed., 1995). 
48 Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean arguments are all over Justice in Robes (pp. 41, 77-78, 93-94, 105-16, 147-62), and they 




referent is in some sense created by us (unlike discourse on the natural kind concept water), but whose 
content is nevertheless never exhausted by our attitudes, because disagreement over the application of 
the concept, and even challenges to universally accepted views, are possible even against a background 
of conventional agreement (unlike the discourse on the criterial concept sofa).  
Let us begin by considering the case of sofas: we can imagine someone arguing that we have all 
been wrong in our understanding of what sofas are, and that in fact they are objects of ritual.49 We 
would, no doubt, initially tell such a person that he simply does not know what a sofa is. But with 
enough persuasive power and some evidence we might come to appreciate his claims. If that is true, 
then the only difference between the concept of equality and the concept of sofa is that in the former 
debate about what the concept refer to is real in the case of equality and merely hypothetical in the case 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(1) Against the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics and between conceptual and normative 
discussions of political concepts (pp. 108-10).  
(2) More generally, against the distinction between claims within a practice and claims about claims within a practice. 
This is his claim against philosophers who “distinguish the first-order discourse of the practice [those theorists] study… from 
their own second-order platform or ‘meta’ discourse, in which first-order concepts are defined and explored” (p. 141). 
(3) Against a distinction of principle between general jurisprudence and doctrinal analysis of particular cases (see text 
accompanying note 32, supra). 
(4) Against the possibility of making non-perspectival statements (pp. 37-38). 
Theorists of entirely different philosophical persuasions who have offered utterly different arguments defending these 
different views are thus all found to be guilty of Archimedeanism. It is unlikely that all four versions of Dworkin’s anti-
Archimedeanism are true (partly because in attacking (1) and (2) Dworkin comes extremely close to endorsing something like 
(4)), but even if they are, Dworkin needs four different arguments to show that. Dworkin might contend (using some meta-
anti-Archimedean argument, perhaps) that despite appearances all these arguments are actually the same, but he has not done 
that. 
I should note that though I will discuss some aspects of Dworkin’s anti-Archimedeanism that are pertinent for 
understanding his theory of law, my comments are by no means exhaustive of what I believe to be the problems with it. For 
this one should start with Dworkin’s fullest anti-Archimedean manifesto, not reprinted in Justice in Robes, namely Ronald 
Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 89 (1996). For criticism see Allan, supra note 3; 
Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 66 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001); see also 
SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING 296-97 (1998). 
49 Cf. Tyler Burge, Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind, 83 J. PHIL. 697, 707-10 (1986). Burge’s argument seeks to 
establish that communal agreement can never fix the content of concepts, because “the sort of agreement that fixes a 
communal meaning … is itself, in principle, open to challenge.” Id. at 707. This means that by Burge’s own lights either there 
are no criterial concepts, or every criterial concept has the potential to become an interpretive concept. We need not 
consider the former possibility here (as Dworkin evidently believes there are criterial concepts). The latter possibility is one 




of sofas. Can this be the basis for the distinction between criterial and interpretive concepts? This 
solution seems unappealing, because it suggests that if a vigorous debate were to emerge about sofas, 
this would change the concept sofa from a criterial to an interpretive one. More seriously it would 
suggest that what distinguishes between criterial and interpretive concepts is nothing more than the 
contingent fact about the existence of debate on its criteria. If that is all, then it would turn out that 
Dworkin’s claims about the need for a new kind of concept to accommodate social practices were 
exaggerated.  
But this seems to be exactly Dworkin’s view. Tucked away in one of the endnotes we find 
Dworkin’s offhand remark that “[p]erhaps some or all interpretive concepts began their conceptual lives 
as criterial.” He also adds “for example” that “[a]n imprecise criterial concept becomes interpretive when 
it is embedded in a rule or direction or principle on whose correct interpretation something important 
turns” (p. 264, n.7, emphasis added).50  Notice how Dworkin smuggles in the notion of “correct” 
interpretation, but whether such a “correct” interpretation (one that transcends the shared criteria of a 
particular linguistic community) exists is exactly the question at stake, and the account he gives leaves 
open less extravagant explanations, that do not demand the invention of new concepts. Indeed, now it 
seems that even by Dworkin’s lights interpretive concepts are either concepts about which it is 
implicitly accepted that their criteria of application are open for challenge, or alternatively that the 
disagreement emerges because different people use the same word while employing different (criterial) 
concepts. Both these possibilities explain how a criterial concept could become interpretive, but both 
explanations do so by making the notion of interpretive concepts explanatorily redundant. Moreover, 
because Dworkin says nothing about the “mechanics” of transformation from criterial to interpretive 
concept, this “historical” account of the emergence of interpretive concepts leaves it utterly mysterious 
how, once criterial concepts become interpretive, they acquire objective content that may be different 
from what any user of them ever entertained.  
Instead of answering such challenges what Dworkin does is block all evidence that could 
undermine his account (e.g., that disagreement is the result of different people having conflicting 
criterial concepts) as irrelevant. For instance, according to Dworkin anyone who tries to use empirical 
findings about the moral views of different people at different times is making a fundamental error, 
because all this evidence belongs to different intellectual “domains” like sociology or anthropology, and 
as such has no bearing whatsoever on morality proper, which seeks to discover the true content of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
50 Is this why at one point Dworkin says that marriage is a criterial concept (p. 9), and at another that it is an 




moral concepts (pp. 76-78). But this claim is problematic in several respects. First, Dworkin simply 
asserts this view, without explaining on what basis he makes it. Second, this assertion is 
Archimedeanism par excellence. This claim by itself is not part of moral discourse but a claim about moral 
discourse, or more precisely, about what could belong to moral discourse. Third, Dworkin provides no 
standard for deciding which claims are internal moral claims and which are sociological observations 
that are not part of the moral “domain.” In fact, he often relies on “sociological” observations about 
moral discourse as if they are part of morality, or at least as supporting his view about the objectivity of 
morality. For instance he has argued that “[p]eople who say that it is unjust to deny adequate medical 
care to the poor do not think that they are just expressing an attitude or accepting a rule or standard as a 
kind of personal commitment. They think they are calling attention to something that is already true 
independently of anyone’s attitude, including theirs….”51 But this seems like a sociological fact, which 
by Dworkin’s lights should be irrelevant for understanding the content of moral concepts. Why are such 
empirical observations (for which, by the way, Dworkin offers no evidence) within the domain of 
morality?  
By not providing a standard for distinguishing what belongs to the domain of moral discourse, 
Dworkin manages to immune his argument from criticism. Any suggestion that moral discourse might 
be mistaken is either interpreted “internally” and as such can only serve as further proof that moral 
discourse is interpretive, and (because of Dworkin’s definition of interpretive concepts) as further 
support for the claim that the concept has objective content; or it is interpreted as belonging to a 
different “domain” and as such as irrelevant to the debate about law’s objectivity! 
Imagine a similar argument about a different question: theologians of different religions have been 
arguing for centuries about the correct attributes of God. I believe not even the most devout would 
argue from the existence of a debate about God’s attributes to the existence of God. To be sure, it may 
show the existence of “God” within a certain discourse, but that God exists only within that discourse. 
This, however, would be little consolation for the person who wants to know whether God exists, not 
whether “God” exists.  
This shows that something has gone wrong with Dworkin’s argument, and it also points to where 
the error is: Dworkin recognizes this challenge and answers that unlike claims about God or astrology, 
“morality and the other evaluative domains make no causal claims.”52 But if that is the case, how do we 
get to know what morality requires? If we reject the possibility of some special moral faculty by which 
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we get a sense of the moral as implausible, then we remain we the possibility that morality and its 
requirements are what is accepted as part of some discourse. The implications of this view to Dworkin’s 
position are devastating. 
An example from a different domain will help us understand the issues. Consider the discourse 
that exists among literary theorists of explaining Hamlet’s behavior. There exists a certain discourse and 
there are certain rules on the question what counts as “valid moves” within the discourse. For instance, 
the text of Hamlet is considered important for assessing Hamlet’s behavior whereas the text of volume 1 
of the Harvard Law Review is not. Suppose now someone comes and claims that it makes no sense to 
ascribe any beliefs, desires, or qualities to Hamlet, since he does not exist and never existed, and that 
only real persons can have psychological attitudes. This skeptical “error theory” about Hamlet would 
strikes us as odd; as a challenge that somehow misses the point of the debate for reasons very similar to 
those Dworkin advances against the skeptical critic of the objectivity of morality: from within the 
discourse that presupposes Hamlet’s existence (even if in a make-believe way) it literally makes no 
sense to raise the skeptical claim that Hamlet does not exist. In contrast as an external claim made from 
outside the discourse, this claim, though true, is irrelevant because the Hamlet discourse operates on a 
“separate domain” from that of the real world.53 Crucially, however, in the same way that the “Hamlet 
discourse” can disregard as irrelevant anything that happens outside its domain, other domains are 
unaffected by what happens within that domain. This is in fact the exact mirror image of the 
unintelligibility of the external skeptical claim from within the practice. And so any claim made within 
the discourse will not be intelligible outside the discourse. If one fails to join in the “make-believe” game 
of Hamlet’s existence, all ascriptions of attitude to him would be false. This means that the discourse 
cannot “impose” itself on those who do not join it. Only once one joins a discourse, and only so long as 
one remains within the discourse, one is bound by the normative limits it sets. 
But in this way Dworkin, who professes to defend the common sense conception of morality, ends 
up offering a conception of morality that is fundamentally different from it, a set of demands that one 
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discourse. Dworkin would presumably deny that such a third type exists and that all such claims are reducible to claims within 
the practice. His argument would be that these are internal claims because they will affect our first-order judgments about 
Hamlet. (This is one type of his anti-Archimedeanism.) But this argument is unsuccessful: one can claim that in ascribing 
beliefs to Shakespeare’s Hamlet we should rely on the Danish legend of Hamlet (or Amleth), which served as a source in 
writing the play. It is true, of course, that our view on this question is likely to affect our judgment on Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
but one can decide on the question whether the legend is an acceptable source for discussing Shakespeare’s Hamlet 




has to follow only if one “signs in” to them. Common sense morality claims universality that is not 
grounded in the existence of a discourse, and it denies that morality is something we need to “sign in” to 
or can “sign out” of. Moral discourse presents itself as making universal demands upon us, demands that 
are not part of a “game.” Dworkin might try to present this claim itself as within the discourse itself, but 
no matter how universally a discourse takes itself to be (or participants in the discourse believe it to be), 
the discourse cannot have any normative force beyond its boundaries. Since the claims to the 
universality of the discourse are themselves made within the discourse, they too are only intelligible 
from within the discourse.  
The analogy with the “Hamlet discourse” also helps us see why, contrary to Dworkin’s claims (p. 
37), there is no inconsistency in making both internal claims within moral discourse and external, even 
skeptical, claims about the practice from outside: there is no contradiction in making certain “internal” 
claims about Hamlet’s character while recognizing that Hamlet does not exist and that therefore all 
claims about him are in some sense false.  
Thus, by insisting on the “independence” of moral concepts (pp. 76-78) Dworkin insulates his 
argument from criticism, but he does so in a question-begging fashion, for it is exactly the independence 
of moral discourse that his opponents challenge. It is exactly the claim of some moral anti-realists that 
even though moral discourse is conducted as if morality is independent of other discourses, its claim to 
independence can make sense only if certain, and highly implausible facts, are true.54 To answer by 
saying that this claim is false because moral discourse is conducted independently of other discourses is 
not to answer the challenge but to repeat the claim being challenged.  
All this shows that Dworkin’s response has no force against the moral skeptic who claims that the 
kind of claims that morality makes are false. At this point Dworkin may revise his response by saying 
that though this imaginary objector is right, her claim is not interesting or important for real life debate: 
we may have some academic interest in the moral nihilist, but she is not someone we encounter in real 
life and her qualms are of little practical interest. Most professed moral skeptics live a moral life and 
defend or criticize certain moral behaviors. Evidently then, in word and action they joined the moral 
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MACKIE, supra, at 22, 25-27. His argument is that the kind of objectivity that moral discourse presents itself to have, i.e. 
objectivity that does not depend on the existence and acceptance of a certain discourse, is false. For a powerful defense of 




discourse and therefore their external challenges are just as interesting as skeptical comments about 
Hamlet’s real-life existence made in the course of a Shakespeare convention.55 
But even this construal of Dworkin’s argument does not lead to the conclusion he seeks. Dworkin 
relied on the fact of persistent disagreement about moral concepts to show that participants in the 
discourse are trying to offer the best account they can of a single, shared, concept. But if Dworkin 
endorses the fact that moral discourse is independent of other discourses and “answers” only to 
arguments from within, he must allow for the possibility of several moral discourses, that are by-and-
large internally consistent but are, at least to some degree, incomprehensible to each other. That is one 
possible way of introducing the evidence about different moral codes in different times and in different 
parts of the world, evidence that Dworkin did not contest but dismissed as irrelevant. This is a possible 
explanation for the existence of moral disagreement, and unlike Dworkin’s this explanation enjoys 
much evidential support and does not require any of the heavy-duty philosophical argument that 
involves the invention of new kinds of concepts that Dworkin advances in order to support his view. On 
this account many of today’s moral clashes are the result of different moral traditions that developed 
with relative independence and internal coherence from each other until disappearing geographical or 
cultural barriers have brought them together, and quite often into clash. In fact, even within the 
“Western” moral tradition we can trace two distinct and until recently quite separate moral discourses, 
one, Judeo-Christian, mainly concerned with ideas of duty, action, and individual responsibility, and 
more recently rights; and the other, Greco-Roman, which is founded on ideas of virtue, character, 
nature, and community.56 Many modern moral conflicts can be traced back to these two conflicting 
moral discourses.  
How Dworkin would respond to this suggestion is not entirely clear. Sometimes he seems to hold 
a view that accepts the conclusion that there may be more than one objective truth to a particular moral 
or legal question. He says at one point that for a view to be objective all that is required is that it be 
supported by “[s]ubstantive reasons” (p. 260): “If we think that our reasons for thinking [that the 
manufacturers of a dangerous medicine are legally responsible for injuries in proportion to their market 
                                                                                                                                                                         
55 Though Dworkin never says that the external challenge is possible and makes sense, it often seems to be that he is less 
concerned with the moral nihilist who denies the intelligibility of all moral claims, and more with the moral skeptic who goes 
on to make “internal” moral claims (e.g., pp. 93-94). See also Dworkin, supra note 48, at 93-94. 
56 The inconsistency of Christian and Greek moralities is the running theme in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE 
GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Douglas Smith trans., Oxford University Press 1996) (1887). Related ideas are developed also in 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 51-61 (2d ed. 1984); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE 




share], then we must also think that the proposition that the manufacturers are liable is objectively true” 
(id.). So for our legal responses to be objectively true, all that we need is to think (confidently?) that our 
reasons supporting those views are convincing. In the end what counts are “any lawyer’s or judge’s … 
convictions of personal and political morality” (p. 32, emphasis added; cf. p. 42). But there are other 
people who are equally confident that there are good reasons leading to the opposite conclusion, and as 
Dworkin admits (in words that have been quoted earlier), he does not believe his arguments would 
convince them. So we have two groups of people with strong convictions that their opposite 
conclusions to legal questions are explained by good reasons, and thus both groups satisfy Dworkin’s 
requirements for objective truth. Needless to say, if that is all that Dworkin means by objectivity, there 
is little to object about it. But if that counts as objective truth, what by Dworkin’s lights could count as 
a discourse on which there is no objective truth? More importantly, since this sense of objectivity could 
legitimate every decision, it is hard to see how it could legitimate any decision. 
At other times Dworkin seems to say something else. In answering the claim that moral values 
conflict he says that anyone who wants to support this view must show “why the understanding of that 
value that produces the conflict is the most appropriate one” (p. 116, emphasis added), and that we must 
always try to articulate a “conception” (p. 114) of those values in which they do not conflict. Dworkin 
thus criticizes those theorists who seem to believe they are merely describing a fact about morality when 
they talk about value conflicts (pp. 109-10).57 
Dworkin’s suggestion, if I understand him correctly, is that while it might be possible to interpret 
the fact of disagreement as the result of several “internal” moral discourses, which may employ similar 
words but give them very different meaning, this is not the best interpretation of the facts. Since 
Dworkin believes that moral discourse is interpretive all the way down, he would contend that we 
should strive for the best interpretation of morality, the interpretation that presents morality itself in the 
best light. And the best interpretation of moral discourse is one that makes the debate among its 
participants meaningful. But if participants in the debate are using the same word for different concepts, 
then it would follow that they are wasting their time talking at cross-purposes. It therefore would 
present the debate in better light if we treated the participants as engaged in a single moral discourse 
which is independent from other domains and that disagreements in it have a single right answer. 
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At first this seems a plausible suggestion, but it leads to a remarkable conclusion that the more 
disagreement there is on the content of a certain concept, the more this suggests that the dispute has a 
right answer, because interpreting it in this way presents it in better light. Furthermore, it suggests that 
it does not matter what participants in the debate themselves think of their dispute. Even if they 
themselves believe they are arguing over different yet inconsistent moral concepts (which, by the way, 
need not necessarily render their debates pointless), if we the theorists believe it presents their debate 
in better light, then we should interpret their debate differently from their understanding of it. 
Suppose, however, we accepted the idea that we should try to interpret morality so as to show it 
in its best light, is there any reason to think that Dworkin’s interpretation puts moral discourse in its 
best light? Consistent with his anti-Archimedeanism Dworkin seems to suggest, that the no-conflict 
conception of moral discourse is the most appropriate because it is morally superior. But such an 
argument is circular, for the interpretation it advances of the practice is based on Dworkin’s own ideal 
of what the practice should be like. As such it will leave cold anyone who has a different interpretation 
of what would make for a superior practice. Take, for instance, Dworkin’s claim that moral 
propositions are not demonstrable in the way that mathematical propositions are (p. 267 n.14). This 
may be seen as an undesirable result of Dworkin’s own interpretation (or conception) of morality. 
Someone who believes that the morally best conception of morality is one that would make morality as 
demonstrable as possible would be led to a conception of morality very different from Dworkin’s. The 
problem is that since both interpretations would support themselves by their own understanding of 
what is morally superior (or what would make moral discourse appear in better light), neither will be 
able to undermine the other. Similarly, someone who argues that the morally best conception of 
morality is one in which some moral conflicts exist (because, for example, such a conception respects the 
people who have, or had, those moral views and their traditions) would not be in a position to 
challenge, or be challenged by, Dworkin’s conception. In either case the result is two self-validating 
“best” conceptions of morality, helpful and action-guiding for those already committed to them, but 
unconvincing to those who do not. Now, if Dworkin believes that two such conceptions can be put side 
by side and compared on some ground, then it must be on the basis of some (moral?) standard that is 
outside the two conceptions, thus undermining his rejection of Archimedeanism. If he does not believe 
such a standard exists, then because the validity of each conception is internal to itself, debate between 




C. Dworkin’s Thesis in Practice 
This has been a lengthy journey into questions of moral (and by implication legal) objectivity, and 
in the heat of the argument the relevance of some of the questions discussed to Dworkin’s overarching 
argument may have been lost. So it is time to tie the different threads together: we set out to examine 
these questions of objectivity because of Dworkin’s argument that tied law’s legitimacy to judges’ 
finding the right (moral) answers to legal questions. And this argument seems to work only if there are 
right answers to moral questions.  
But perhaps the real test of Dworkin’s argument is not in the Olympian heights of abstract moral 
philosophy. All of Dworkin’s arguments examined so far—his rejection of the positivist model of rules, 
the idea of interpretive concepts, his peculiar defense of the objectivity, which makes objective value 
depend on the existence of disagreement—should all be seen as scaffolds to a single huge construction 
whose ultimate conclusion is “Therefore, courts should be actively engaged in political debate (and 
decide the case in the following way).” Even Dworkin’s tendency to use similar arguments to challenge 
theorists with utterly different views (like all the theorists Dworkin labels Archimedeans, or his odd 
coupling of Sunstein and Hart, p. 65) makes more sense from this perspective: what matters to 
Dworkin is that these theorists challenged the ultimate conclusion about the role of the courts. So the 
real test of his ideas is how they play out in the workings of courts. If his arguments work in practice, 
then perhaps that is all that we should care about. I turn to this question now. 
Although Hercules, Dworkin’s imaginary judge who played a lead role in many of Dworkin’s 
writings on the subject58 only makes a cameo appearance in Justice in Robes (pp. 53-57), his spirit 
pervades the book. Dworkin still urges judges to confront the moral issues before them, and still urges 
other branches of government to become more like his conception of the ideal judiciary,59 and not the 
other way around. 
The Herculean model manifests three aspects of Dworkin’s thought. First, the legal decision 
rendered by following it is (prima facie) legitimate, because the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends 
on finding the correct answer to legal questions. Hercules then is not just a good advice: significant 
degree of compliance with it is required to guarantee the legitimacy of a legal system. Second, by 
definition Hercules cannot be mistaken; the results of the Herculean method constitute the right 
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answer.60 This implies that virtually all significant instances of disagreements among judges are the 
result of judicial failure to employ the Herculean method: if we all had Herculean powers, there would 
no longer be legal disagreements61 (except, perhaps, for disagreements on the application of vague 
concepts to marginal cases). This is of course a corollary to Dworkin’s rejection of Archimedeanism and 
belief that moral (and legal) correctness are set by the discourse, and not by anything external to it. 
Hercules is simply someone capable of taking in and “computing” the entire legal-moral discourse and 
thus guaranteeing the correctness of his judgments. Third, the extension of the model to legislatures is 
closely tied to Dworkin’s conception of democracy that ignores the desires of majorities when those 
infringe rights,62 which may be just the flipside of the argument for Herculean method: the very reasons 
for trusting the judgment of Hercules are the reasons for not caring much for the plainly un-Herculean 
judgments of most members of society.  
Modeling adjudication and Politics (with a capital P) after the philosopher-judge has an inspiring 
ring, but I will argue that Dworkin’s arguments in support of Herculean adjudication are unconvincing. 
Dworkin’s focus on the question of legitimacy and his view that connects legitimacy to moral 
correctness leads him to neglect what may be a far more pressing issue. My concern with Hercules is 
not that he is so unlike any real life judges, as many critics have suggested.63 It is the exact opposite: it is 
that when something reasonably close to the Herculean model is put in practice the results are quite 
different from those envisioned by Dworkin. The United States Supreme Court is as close an example 
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This is what Coleman and Leiter called “modest objectivity.” See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 47, at 263-64. They argue, and 
I agree with them, that Dworkin is a modest objectivist. Id. at 274-76. 
61 Dworkin’s more substantive writings on particular constitutional questions are dedicated to exposing exactly those 
errors, and to offering his Herculean helping hand. After all, even though “[t]he courts are the capitals of law’s empire, and 
judges are its princes, … [i]t falls to philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law’s ambitions for itself, the purer form of 
law within and beyond the law we have.” DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 407. 
62 See DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 39, at 139-47 (questioning majoritarian democracy and outlining a 
“partnership” conception of democracy instead); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 356-70 (2000) (same); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 344 (1996) (“individual citizens can in fact exercise the moral responsibilities of citizenship better when final 
decisions involving constitutional values are removed from ordinary politics and assigned to courts.”). 
63 See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence, in ANALYZING LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 79, 
102 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) (“One thing judges cannot do is what Dworkin’s Judge Hercules does”); Adrian Vermuele & Ernest 
A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 730-31, 759 (2000). Dworkin 




of Herculean adjudication as one is likely to ever find, but this implies that the Court delivers full 
opinions on less than a hundred cases a year, instead of, say a thousand cases a year.64 A court that tries 
to decide one case according to the Herculean approach will not be able to decide ten other cases at all. 
This of course does not yet suggest that the philosopher-judge model is wrong, but it shows that it 
comes with substantial costs, and these are not necessarily strictly monetary costs, but quite possibly 
“moral costs” as well.  
Ironically, this point can be illustrated by Sindell,65 the paradigmatic example in Justice in Robes for 
the virtues of principled adjudication (pp. 7-8, 17-18, 22-23, 51, 143-44, 164-65, 208, 244, 260). This 
case introduced the notion of market share liability to allow plaintiffs to get compensation in mass torts 
involving multiple negligent defendants which could not be identified as the injurers of individual 
plaintiffs. Dworkin uses this case as an example of how thinking on the rights and duties of the parties in 
question has led the court to the right decision. But even if we believe that the court reached the right 
result in this case, it is exactly this kind of case that shows the limitations of the approach Dworkin 
advocates. Not only was market share liability rejected in numerous states for various reasons that have 
to do both with questioning the justice in imposing such liability and the possibility of defendants being 
required to pay more damages than the harm they caused, some courts were also concerned with the 
manageability of handling such claims in courts.66 Even in those jurisdictions that recognized market 
share liability, it was subjected to limits, which were justified by the impossibility of guaranteeing a just 
or manageable process of decision-making.67 Dworkin could of course reply that these are all mistaken 
decisions. But even if we were convinced by his reply, such an answer would miss the point of the 
critique, which is that because of what courts are and because of the conditions under which they 
                                                                                                                                                                         
64 For the “Herculization” of Supreme Court decisions see Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1103-04 (1987) 
(describing the increased length and expansiveness of Supreme Court decisions). The negative implications of this process are 
analyzed thoughtfully in Strauss’s essay. It should be noted that since 1987 the number of cases the Supreme Court hears has 
gone further down. See Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at 
A1. 
65 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  
66 See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 337-43 (Ill. 1990) (pointing out both manageability and justice 
concerns); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 189-90 (Mass. 1982) (focusing on justice concerns); Sutowski v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1998) (focusing on separation of powers considerations).  
67 In particular this refers to the requirement of “fungibility.” As a result the Market share liability doctrine has been 
rejected in various areas. See Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 35-36 (Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to 




operate, the likelihood of such errors is significant. Dworkin cannot isolate Sindell as proof that his 
suggested approach works and disregard the context of other cases decided in the same area that show 
that it does not.  
I believe, however, that there is an even more significant problem with Dworkin’s model of 
Hercules, and it is that his approach is self-defeating. The Herculean model is premised on the existence 
of a legal system that pursues the value of legality, the value Dworkin now sees as the fundamental value 
for legal practice and thus central to understanding law (pp. 169-70).68 Chief among those is that judges 
are impartial and that they decide cases not according to their personal preferences but according to 
some impartial standards. What ideally makes courts a good place for deliberation is the fact that judges 
are (ideally) elected on the basis of expertise and not because of political affiliation, and they operate in 
an institutional environment that insulates them to some extent from political pressure, not least by the 
existence of certain traditions of appropriate behavior, as well as by more tangible means such as life (or 
long) tenure, and immunity from prosecution (or persecution) for their judicial decisions. Judges are 
never totally politically disinterested (and in the United States probably less so than in other countries), 
but the Herculean model pressures them to act in ways that counter the value of legality and in this way 
undermines the distinction between law and politics. 
Adjudication with a Herculean frame of mind when conducted in an environment saturated with 
politics leads to outcomes that Dworkin himself deplores: the appointment of judges in the United 
States has become a volatile and openly partisan battleground. Against this background prospective 
judges are right to assume that they are elected on a particular political (small “p”) ticket. As a result the 
Supreme Court has often become a forum of personal instead of forum of principle. There is empirical 
evidence of increasing polarization and partisanship in the Supreme Court,69 supported by evidence that 
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radical political groups are making a concentrated effort to advance their cause by getting their favorites 
to the Bench rather than to the legislature or executive.70  
Dworkin would no doubt say that this is a fundamental misunderstanding of the Herculean model, 
which is premised on grounding adjudication on the correct moral principles as discovered by moral 
reasoning. That may be true, but my point is that Dworkin’s model represents an ideal that cannot 
succeed given certain realities about modern politics and perhaps also human nature. I must stress that 
my point is not that courts must not rely on some moral or political considerations. I believe that in 
some sense they have to.71 But recognizing this fact does not imply that courts should engage in moral 
questions in the way Dworkin believes they should. There may be times when this may be required, but 
often it will be wiser for the court to refrain from doing this, because exactly those features that courts 
commonly have and because of which they seem the most appropriate forum for deliberation and moral 
argument are the features that almost inevitably get lost when courts become increasingly engaged 
directly in political argument. 
Perhaps Hercules could engage in principled argument while remaining impartial, perhaps mere 
mortals who work in the slightly less politically loaded atmosphere of the university could use the 
method Dworkin favors and reach the right answers to political questions, but the combination of 
political surroundings and influence and an approach to adjudication, that enjoins judges to engage in 
the political debate makes the infiltration of those outcomes Dworkin laments inevitable.  
There is an air of paradox to what I just said: it suggests that exactly those features that make 
courts the most appropriate of all branches of government for engaging in debate on political rights and 
duties will tend to wane if such debate is conducted in them. But in fact there is little mystery in 
recognizing this point: courts seem the most appropriate bodies for handling such issues because (in 
many countries) judges are not elected in an overtly political process, and judges are required to refrain 
from partiality and partisanship. But relying on these features for assigning political matters to courts 
would naturally lead to pressure that would tend to undermine those very features. This kind of self-
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defeating situation is not an unknown phenomenon.72 In the case of courts, even if we believe that the 
most important general goal for courts is to participate in the fashioning of the values the state should 
pursue (and in this way, as Dworkin believes, help create in society the requisite deliberative attitude 
towards people’s rights and duties), pursuing those goals directly may be the wrong strategy.  
Dworkin has always resisted the simplistic assertion that law is just politics, and I believe that he 
was right about that. But even if false as a general proposition, it is important to bear in mind that law 
may become indistinguishable from politics. When decrying an increasingly partisan Supreme Court (pp. 
24, 104), as well as the fact that nominees to senior judicial positions try to reveal as little as possible of 
their substantive views,73 Dworkin never stops to consider that this may be a direct outcome of the 
politically engaged court he has always advocated. 
D. Legitimacy Without Objectivity?  
We have walked along the path paved by Dworkin with the hope of having a convincing account of 
the legitimacy of law, but the conclusions we reached are disappointing. We have seen that Dworkin’s 
suggestion is fraught with both theoretical difficulties and practical problems. Because Dworkin’s 
account links the legitimacy of law with the objectivity of morality, once the latter falls, the former 
seems to fall with it. Of course, this does not yet imply that law is illegitimate, for there may well be 
other ways to establish law’s legitimacy. We may, for example, adopt Dworkin’s general view about 
the relationship between law’s content and its legitimacy and be persuaded by other defenses of the 
objectivity of morality and the possibility of finding the right answers to legal questions. A different 
possibility is that law may be legitimate if it provides those who are subject to it a right to participate 
and voice their opinion. If a decision-procedure is designed in a way that enables members of a 
community to express their views and affect the content of the laws that will govern them, then 
according to this view, laws may be legitimate even if we know that some people in the end of the 
process will think they are wrong, and even if we have no guarantee that the course elected is indeed 
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the morally right one. I believe this is a more promising route to establishing law’s legitimacy, but it is 
evidently not Dworkin’s. Examining it would therefore have to wait for another occasion. 
IV. INTO THE WORLD 
So how are we to assess Dworkin’s project as it emerges Justice in Robes? My view is that a 
measured assessment of Dworkin’s arguments, one that tries to take sides, shows that some parts of his 
work are worthy of careful consideration, whereas others are unconvincing. But the ultimate test of 
Dworkin’s theory in which jurisprudence is the prologue to how cases are decided, has to be the way 
how theory tests in reality. Yet this is something that Dworkin, always sure of his power of reason, has 
hardly troubled himself with. To be sure, he “tested” his theory on a few famous cases, but he neglected 
the fact that the constraints judges face suggest that his theory might not work when it is required to 
operate in a politically loaded environment or even such a mundane fact as heavy workloads. 
In fact, even with the most celebrated cases, close examination reveals a story quite different from 
Dworkin’s account. The Warren Court is no doubt close to Dworkin’s ideal for how courts should 
perceive of their role and fulfill it, but when discussing its decisions (e.g., p. 123), Dworkin does not 
even spare a nod of recognition to the literature suggesting that that Court had less influence than is 
popularly conceived,74 thus highlighting the limitations of principled politics through courts that 
Dworkin advocates. Furthermore, while arguably this approach had less actual impact than is commonly 
perceived on the issues the Court decided, adopting something like Dworkin’s favored approach had a 
significant effect on how courts in the United States are being perceived. The result was a backlash, still 
visible today, that looks like the exact opposite of Dworkin’s ideals. Instead of courts serving as the 
catalyst for spreading the notion of principled decision-making to other branches of government, what 
happened is that courts’ decisions are increasingly described in terms of the party affiliation or personal 
views of those occupying them. Dworkin is of course keenly aware of the current situation, but he 
never acknowledges—let alone discusses—the possibility that it is not because his approach has not 
been adopted, but because something resembling it has been, that all too often what the Supreme Court 
delivers is not justice, but politics in robes. 
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